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This paper shows that, contrary to commonly held views, the provisions
of the social security law actually provide strong work incentives for older
men. The reason is that, for most workers, higher current earnings lead to
higher future social security benefits. These incentives have been particularly
strong for workers under 65 years of age and, although they will be reduced
somewhat when the 1977 amendments to the social security law become fully
effective, they will remain substantial. The findings raise serious questions
about recent econometric work attributing the decline in labor force partici-
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1. Introduction
Labor force participation rates of older men in the United States have
declined significantly in recent decades. Among the factors that allegedly account
for this phenomenon is the social security system1 which has increased both in coverage
and in generosity over the period. That social security should lead to earlier
retirement seems in accord with common sen and so is widely assumed. Furthermore,
several recent econometric contributions have appeared to buttress this common
1
assumption.
Our purpose in this paper is a curmudgeonly one: to case doubt on the
widespread view that social security provides significant work disincentives for older
men. Our principal reason for raising doubts about the common sense view is a poorly-
understood provision of the law which provides strong work incentives for most workers--
incentives which in many cases are large enough to cancel out or even overwhelm the
work disincentive effects of the earnings te5t.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly describes and
critically evaluates the conventional argument for why social security discourages
labor supply. Section 3 explains in some detail the important aspect of the law that
has hitherto mostly been ignored: the fact that current earnings can increase future
social security benefits. Calculations based on the Longitudinal Retirement History
Survey (LRHS) are presented to show that this effect is typically equivalent to a wage
subsidyroughly equal in size to the tax rate of the earnings test. Section4 offers
some concluding remarks, butourmain message is both simple and important enough to
be inenlioned right at the outset. Social security certainly distort.s labor-leisure
choice, but not in any simple way.It. may in fact induce some older workers to reduce
their labor supply. Buttheremust be many others who--if they understood the law
properly--would be encouraged to work even more than they would in the absenceof
social security.2.
2.Work Disincentives: The Conventional View
The conventional view that social security discourages thework effort of
older workers is based on two perceived problems with the law. First,benefits are
subject to an earnings test which implicitly taxes earningsbeyond an exempt amount
at a 50% marginal rate. Second, actuarial adjustments for thosewho defer benefits
arebelieved to be insufficient, so the expected present valueof social security
benefits declines the longer one stays at work. We take upeach of these in turn.
The Earnings Test
The structure of the social security benefit formula is approximatelyas
follows. Let E(e1, e2, ...,eT),where e1 iscovered earnings 1years ago,
bea vector describing an individual's earnings history;and let X be a vector of
relevant demographic characteristics such as marital status,number of dependent
children, etc. The lawdefines a potential benefit BB(E, x).2cecurrent
earnings,e0 ,passthe exempt amount, in, benefitsare reduced by for each dollar
earned until they are completely exhausted. Thusthe actual benefits received are




zero if earnings exceed m +2B.Thereduction in benefits as earnings rise inthe
range ine0
in+ 2B(the "earnings test') clearly providesa work disincentive.
Thebudget constraint created by the earningstest is portrayed in Figure i
asabcde, where it is contrasted with the budgetconstraint that would prevail in the
absence of social security benefits(ade).3 •The vertical distance ab represents
the benefits that are received at zero earnings.
As earnings rise from zero to in
thereis no reduction in benefits, so the slopeof the budget line is the wage net of
payroll tax, denoted w0(1-t). At point c,the earnings test comes into play, sothe
slope of the budget line isreduced by .5w0 ,andthis continues to be the case until
point d ,whereall benefits are exhausted. Thereafter,the budget constraint for3.
individuals who receive social security benefits corresponds with that for individuals
who do not (line segment de).
The potential work disincentive effects of the earnings test are obvious
from Figure 1 and, indeed, we should not be surprised to find many people "bunched"
at point c.4 This is the basic indictment of the earnings test; but it is naive for
several reasons. The first of these is well known: many individuals who select a point
to the left of point c receive an increase in their future benefits.
Actuarial Adjustments
The nature of the actuarial adjustment made to future social security benefits
of individuals who have some of their benefits withheld depends on whether the individual
is eligible for partial benefits (ages 62-64) or for full benefits (ages 65 and over).
For individuals aged 62-64, the intent of the law is to provide an actuarially
fair increase in future benefits for those who forego current benefits. Let us
consider what an actuarially fair adjustment would mean in terms of the budget constraint
of Figure 1. Individuals who elect not to draw the (partial) benefits for which they
are eligible (the height ab) would have their future benefits increased to compensate
them for this loss on an actuarial basis. Thus consider an individual who chooses
to work enough so as not to draw benefits at age 62. With no actuarial offset, his
net earnings would be e0(l-t), and he would accrue no future social security benefits.
With a full actuarial offset, by contrast, he would receive e0(1-t) from his own
earnings plus an increase in future social security benefits equal in actuarial present
value to the benefits he gives up this year, B, making his total income e0(l-t) +B.
Thus his effective budget constraint, would be parallel to line ade ,anduniformly
above it by an amount equal to B. This is shown in Figure 2 as line abcfg.5
While students of the social security program are well aware of the actuarial
adjustmert given to workers aged 62-64, many have expressed skepticism that it is
actuarially fair.6 To measure the extent to which the compensation actually is fair,we have made computations based on the law as it was in 1973,and life tables based
on 1975, for a number of hypothetical individuals. Ourcalculations can be explained
with reference to Figure 2. In this figure, the kinked budget constraint abcde simply
duplicates Figure 1, and the hypothetical budget lineabcfgindicates what a full
actuarial compensation would create (distance fd is equal to distance ab). Consider
the decision to decrease leisure from 10 to 1 hours. With no actuarial offset,
the individual would move from point c to poinL d .Witha full adjustment, he would
move from point c to point f instead. With a partial adjustment,he would move to
some intermediate point uch as h .Ourcalculations measure the distance dh as
a fraction of the potential distance dfab •Thusa value of zero represents no
actuarial adjustment, a value of unity represents a full adjustment, and so on.
The first two columns of Table 1 offer a selection of the many results we
have obtained. There are several striking aspects. First of all, wehave selected
as our 'base case" a representative 62-year--old: he iswhite and married, his wife
is 59 years old,7 he has no dependent children, and his earnings historygives him
average monthly earnings (AME) of $Li36,anarbitrary butrepresentativeamount. For
such a person, the adjustment is precisely actuarially fair at about a5% interest
rate--a figure that is quite high for a real after-tax interestrate. At more
realistic (lower) interest rates, there is actually a considerableactuarial bonus
for deferrinp benefits.
The story is only slightly less dramatic for an unmarried man.While the
actuarial present value of the increase in his future benefitsis smaller since he
has no wife, so is the current benefit that he gives up.On balance, the actuarial
offset is reduced somewhat. (Compare lines 1 and 2.)
The actuarial offset is smaller, however, if the wifeis at least 65 or if
there are dependent children. The reason is that no compensationis given for wives'
or children's benefits that are lost when theworker foregoes one year's benefitsNotes:
Table 1
Degree of Actuarial Adjustmenta
a. Actuarial increase in future benefits as
potential benefits at age 62.
a fraction of maximum
b. Same as base case, except children are 15 and 16; neither
goes to college.
Age 62 Age 6
___________1%Credit 3Credit
Real Interest Rate
.01 .03 .0]. .03 .01 .03
1. Base case 1.541.22 •3o) .34 .57 .48
2.No wife 1.14 .914..12 .10.36.31
3. Olderwife b
.67 .71 .08.07.24 .20
4. One dependent childb
-7.06.05.18.15
5. Two dependentchildren .56 .43 .03 .03 .10 .085.
by continuing to work. Lines 3-5 in Table 1 showhowthe actuarial offset is reduced
in several such cases. "Older wife" denotes a 62-year-old man with a 65-year-old
wife. For him the actuarial adjustment is unfair, but still restores 71—87% of his
lost benefits.8 The situation is quite similar for a 62-year-old man with a 59-year-
old wife and a 15-year-old child ('one dependent chi1d, line ii-).Forthose few men
of this age with two dependent children (line c) the actuarial offsetfalls far short
of being complete.
Things are quite different, however, for individuals aged65 and over
because, for them, the law makes no effort to give fair actuarial compensationfor
lost benefits. Instead, until the .1977 amendments to the social securitylaw become
effective, a token increase of 1% in future benefits is granted in any yearin which
the individual earns enough to lose all of his current benefits (i.e.,works somewhere
to the left of point d). This introduces an upward discontinuityinto the budget
constraint at point
That this 1% increase in benefits is quite inadequate is seenin the two
middle columns of Table 1--which apply to a 65-year-old man. Exceptfor the base
case, the actuarial adjustment is trivial(12% or less). In the base case, however,
the wife is under 65;sothe offset, though incomplete, is not negligible because
her benefits areessentiallycompensated in full.Just over one—third of lost benefits
are recouped.
The 1977 amendments raise the 1% increase in futurebenefits to 3% beginning
in 1981. As can be seen in the last two columnsof Table 1, this reform will increase
the actuarial adjustment in our base case to around50%--thus negating about half of
the apparent tax implied by the earnings test. Adjustmentsin other cases are smaller,
with single men getting about a one-third offsetand other groups getting still less.
-.
Ourconclusions thus far seem to be as follows.For men aged 62_614 and
eligible for partial benefits, the law provides
actuarial compensation for those ho6.
postpone benefits that is typically fair or more than fair. This means that the
effective budget constraint comes much closer to abcfg in Figure 2 than to abcde, so
that the effective wage is essentially what it would have been in the absence of
social security benefits. For men 65 and over, the actuarial offsets are far from
complete, though the 1977 amendments will eventually make them restore perhaps 30-50%
of the lost benefits for a typical man.
3.The Effect of Current Earnings on Future Benefits
We have thus far argued that, when both the earnings test and the actuarial
offsets are considered simultaneously, the social security law provides neither work
incentives nor disincentives for 62'-64-year-olds, but probably provides some disincentives
for those 65 and older. We now turn to a rather neglected provision of the law which
provides rather dramatic work incentives for almost all older workers.
The provision we have in mind is the automatic recomputation of benefits
whenever current earnings rise above a certain amount. We first describe and evaluate
how this mechanism operated prior to the 1977 amendments to the social security law--
since this is the law that has applied to all men who have retired to date, and
thus to all the recent econometric studies that have purported to detect a negative effect
of social socurty benefits on the labor supply of older men.1° Once this discussion
is complete, we consider how things were changed by the 1977 amendments.
Automatic Benefit Recomputation (ABR)
To illustrate how automatic benefit recomputation (ABR) works, consider a man
turning 65 in 1975. As noted above, the potential benefit for which he is eligible,
B, dept'nds on his earn:thgs history, E, and on two principal demographic characteristics:
whether he is married, and whether he has dependent children. It is calculated in
steps. First, his earnings history is used to compute his Average Monthly Earnings
(ÂME). The AME depends on the T years of highest current earnings between 1951 and
the current ytar, where the value of T is the year in which the irdividual reached7.
65, minus 1956.11 Let the earnings history for thoseT years be (81, e2, ...,eT),
and let e.be the lowest of these. As soon as current earnings, e0,exceed emi
the automatic benefit recomputation provision(APR) comes into play because e0
replaces emin in the earnings base usedfor computing benefits in future years.
The effect of this replacement on ÂME is easy to calculate, asit depends
only on the worker's age. For each dollarof earnings above emjn the ÂME increases
by l/12T (the 12 converts annual earningsto moh1y earnings). But what this increase
in ÂME does to the individual's future benefits depends onseveral other factors.
First, the individual's Primary Insurance Amount(PIA) depends on ÂME in a piecewise
linear fashion, th the slope, PIA/SAME, depending on the worker'sA1€.'2 Next,
the potential monthly benefit, B/12, is defined asP112 F(X)PL&, where the factor
of proportionality, ,dependson whether the individual has a wifeand/or dependent
children.13
Thus the increase in annual benefits when current earningsincrease by one
dollar (assuming current earnings exceed emin)is =r(x)
Finally, the actuarial present valueof this increase in annual benefits depends on
t,he rate of discount and on any factorrelevant to life expectancy (includingthe
life expectancy of the wife, becauseof survivor's benefits).
The first important point to make is thatautomatic benefit recomputation
has been of wide applicability. It is clearthat most able-bodied men with normal
work histories easily earned much more (innominal dollars) at age 65 than they did
in the worstof theirprevious best T earning years.(That is, e0 normally nnich
exceedede.)Sothe effect was relevant to most workersand became operative
mm
at fairly low levels of work effort.
The secorxi important. point is thatthe qualitative effectof the APRcan
be quite impressive. For an individual turning65 in 1975, T =19,so each dollar of
earnings above emin adds 1/(12 x19) .00144 to his ÂME. Around the mean ofthe8.
distribution of MIE, PIA/ AHE is about .45, so the PIA increasesby about .l9çt
for each dollar of additional earnings. If he is married, this increasein the P1A
raises the monthly benefit check by so the annual check goes up by while
this may seem small, it must be remembered that this amount is to be receivedfor as
long as the individual lives, and then two-thirds of it is received foras long as
the wifesurvives.For a 1% real interest rate and actual life expectancies,an
actuarial present value calculation amounts to multiplying this annual benefit of
by a factor of about 16. The conclusion, therefore, is that the additional social
security benefits attributable to the recomputation amountto about for each
dollar of earnings; that is, the marginal return to work effort isthereby increased
by 51% of the wage rate. This is hardly a trivial effect, tosay the least.
Since the value of benefits from ABR is obviously sensitive to the
discount rate used, this is an appropriate point to explain ouruse of such low
discount rates. Note first that a real after-tax interest rate isappropriate, since
social security benefits are indexed and tax free, and that such ratesare historically
very low. (Indeed, they are often negative.) Second, note that (except for issues
of risk aversion) the probability that the individual might die is irrelevant to the
choice of discount rate because survival probabilities are automatically incorporated
in theactuarialpresent value calcu].ations. Third, while high rates of subjective
time preference are often confused with high rates of interest, only interest rates
are relevant to valuing streams of future income. Subjective time preferences come
into play only in deciding how to consume the value of an asset over one's remaining
lifetime. Even if older men have very high subjective discount rates, it would still
beappropriat.e to use the low market interest rate unless these men had drawn down all their
otherassets and were being constrained by an inability to borrow against future
socialsecurity benefits. For all these reasons, we believe that a very low discount
rate like $ismost appropriate.9.
The effective budget constraint created bythe automatic benefit recomputation
depends on the relationship between
and the exempt amount under the earnings
test, in.Figure 3a, which is meant to represent a65-year-old and ignores the actuarial
adjustment mentioned in Section 2,iUustratesa case where benefit recomputation
comes into play only after the earningstest. Without recomputation, the budget
constraint would be abcde. With it,thebudge constraint isabcfgh.'4 In our
illustrative example, the slope on fg is w0(l-t+ .04), and the slope on gh is
w0(l-t
+ .54). It is clear that, while it is still possiblefor a utility maximizing
worker to select point c ,thischoice is much less likely than it would appearto
be under the conventional view thatenvisions a budget constraint like abcfde.
Figure 3b illustrates a casewhere falls below m ,sothat automatic benefit
computation actually comes into effectbefore the earnings test. Here is seems quite
unlikely indeed that social securitywould provide a work disincentive.
Now these examples while quite typical, arenot of universal applicability.
The magnitude of the wage subsidy implicit
in AER depends on the individual's age,
his vintage, his marital status,his wife's age, whether hehasdependent children,
thelevel of his AME, his life expectancy(which varies ñth health and race),and
15
howmuch hoplans towork in the future.
Two questions naturally arise aboutthe population of potentialsocial
securityrecipients in the United States.First, at has the actualdistribution of
values looked like? This governshow many people can take advantageof benefit
rccompUtatiofl. Second, how largehave the wage subsidies implicitin ABR been for
actual workers?
Evidence fromthe Retirement History Sury
Toanswer these questions we havedone extensive calculationsbased onactual
individuals intheLongitudinal Retirement History Survey(LRJIS). We considered each
ofthe907menintheIRITS *ioturned65in1975.Fromeach man'ssocialsecurity
earnings history and demographicdata, itwaspossible to calculate preciselyboth10.
thelevel of earnings at which ARR came into play (p.)andthe magnitude of the
implicitwage subsidy. Tables 2 and 3summarize the results.
Lookfirstat columns (1) and (2) in Table 2, which indicate how common
automatic benefit recomputation has been in practice. About 224% of married men and
32 of single men were eligible for an implicitwage subsidy from ABRontheir very
first dollar of earnings =0)because they had not worked in covered employment
for T years. Virtually 100% of the sample would have been able to receive ABR before
they earned $5,000. For reference, average annual earnings of all private nonfarrn
workers in the U.S. in 1975 exceeded $8,000. Another way to put these results into
perspective is to note that the exeipt amount of earnings under the social security
law, denoted inabove,was $2,520 in 1975. Thus for almost half of all workers the
wage subsidy from ABR became relevant before the tax from the earnings test, so that
Figure 3b rather than Figure 3a was relevant.
The next question is how large the implicit wage subsidies implied by
automatic benefit recomputation actually are. Table 3, which contains the principal
results of this paper, tabulates the frequency distribution of this subsidy expressed
asa percentage of thecurrent wage. For the most part the calculations use the 1
percent discount rate that we find most realistic. However, for those who prefer a
higher rate, we also show results based on a 5% discount rate. Each column in t.e
table is a frequency distribution. Thus, for example, with a 1% discount rate and the
1975 law, colunin (1), 42.14 of married men had subsidy rates between 55% and 60%,
33.1% hrid subsidy rates btweon 50% and 55%, and so on.
The results in columns (1)-(3) are quite striking. Implicit subsidy rates
for married men average about 54%, with most concentrated in the 50-60% range.16
Thus benefit recomputation just about offsets the tax implicit in the earnings test.
Even at a 5% discount rate, which we view as far too high, most married men still hadTable 2
Distri'cuton of e
Value of e
?ercentage of men reaching 65in 1975:



























































































Mean value $2,378 $1,841 $3,738 $2,904
Sample size 771 136 771 136
is the lowest annual earnings figurein the earnings base used
tocompute ÂME for the 1975law orADE for the post_1977_amendlTlents
law.Table 3
Distribution of Implicit Wage Subsidy Rates




Percentae of n reaching 65in1975
Under 1975 Law After 1977 Amendments
MarriedMarriedSir.gle





















































implicit subsidy rates between 35and Single men receive only about half this
subsidy rate, however.
The conclusion, then, is that our illustrative example is indeed representative
of the situation that has faced the vast majority of married men whoreached retirement
age during the 1970s. The automaticbenefit recomputation certainly has been no mere
detail.
It is, however, worth paying some attention to the tails of the distributions
in Table 3.Lookingfirst at the lower tail, we note that 9Zofmarried men andabout
15% ofsingle men get no benefit recomputation at all. Theseindividuals are at
the minimum PIA, so their benefits are independent of current erningsat the margin.
For this minority, budget constraint abcde in Figure3a is afairly accurate
representationof their choice set, and so work disincentives are likely. At theother
extreme, however, we find that about 14percentof married men and about 1.5 percent
of single men turning 65 in 1975 experienced implicit wage subsidies greaterthan 70
percent: This is an extremely largewedge' whichshould have had a correspondingly
largeincentive effect ontheir labor supply.
Onefurther characteristic of the automatic benefit recomputation(ABR)
merits consideration. The actuarial present value of anyincrease in future social
security benefits obviously depends on age.All the calculations in Table 13 are based
on 65-ycar-olds. If we considered these sareindividuals at a younger age, the annual
flows of future benefits from ABR would be identical,but the discount factors needed
to convert these flows to anequivalentcurrent wage subsidy would be greater. Thus
the implicit suhdy rate is lower at younger ages,which provides an incentive to
shift labor supply to older ages--exactly the oppositeof the assunption made by
Burkhauser and Turner (1978).
For men older than 6,however,potential benefits always start "next year,"
so the number of years overwhich benefits can be received falls, thus reducingthe12.
implicit subsidy. For example, the average subsidy rate for married men using a 1%
discount rate falls from 54%atage 65,to44% by age 69and34%byage 73.Thusthe
subsidy rate peaks at age 65.
Combiningboth of these cases, it seems that the automatic benefit
recomputation provision, considered in isolation, provides some incentive to concentrate
work effort around age 65.Aswe have seen earlier, however, the actuarial offsets
to the earnings test are normally fair before age 6andunfair thereafter. So it
seems that when both factors are considered social security provides the strongest
work incentives for individuals aged 62-64--precisely the group thatmany have claimed
are induced to retire prematurely by social security
The 1977 Social Security Amendments
In 1977 many aspects of the social security law were revamped, and one of
these changes affected automatic benefit recomputation in an important way. Prior to
the 1977 amendments, the A1€ was based on the nominal earnings history. Since the
1977 amendments,covered earnings through age 60havebeen indexed to average earnings
in the year in which the individual turns 60. Thus, for example, if a nominal
earnings figure like $1,600 from some past year is included in the earnings base,
but average wages have tripled between that year and the year inwhichthe individual
turns60, then $4,800 is used in computing Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIMS).
Earningsafter age 6oare included without indexing, just as before.
Thiselement of indexing has a clear effect on the likelihood that any
particular individual will be subject to automatic benefit recomputation: it lowers
the chances by substantially reducing the gap between "old earnings" and "current
earnings" for most people. In addition, for those who remain subject to ABR, the
implicit subsidy rates were reduced by the 1977 amendments because the amendments,
while raising typical AIMS values by indexing, simultaneously reduced the slope
coefficients (PIA/ AI1E. For most people, this reduction was about one-third,
indicating a one-third reduction in the typical subsidy rate.13.
Nonetheless,due to the combined effects of inflation since age 60 and
thenormal life-cycle pattern in earnings, most older workers are stillable to earn
muchmorethan emin by working close to full time. On balance, then,while the 1977
amendments will reduce both the fraction of the population subjectto AERand the
typical wage subsidies that it provides, itstill seems likely that a large number
of older workers will receive sizeable implicit wagesubsidies through ABR.
Sincethe 1977 amendments are not yet fully effective, wehave no actual sample
of potential retirees whose subsidy rates we can compute.Our approachwas to pretend
that,the 1977 amendments had been in effect in 1975,theyear our sample of men
reached age 6. We computed AIME foreachman, applying indexing as prescribedin
the 1977 amendments,
17and repeated the calculations discussed earlier. Bydoing so,
we get a quantitative "feel" for the changesin ABR wrought by the amendments.
As columns (3)and(L)of "able2 point out, the distribution of emin is
pushed 'outward (compare columns (i) and(2). The most commonvaluesof efl for
marriedmen, for example, would have beenin the$6,000-$7,200 range with indexing
instead of in the $3,600-$4,800 range. Clearlythis means that some workers that were
eligible for benefit rncomputati-on without indexingwould not have been eligible if
indexinghadbeen in effect. The mean value of would have been increased 5
byindexing. Note, however, the obviouspoint madeby the top row of Table 2:
indexinghas no effect whatever onthe substantial minority of men whose emin's
are zero because they lack sufficient yearsof covered earnings. And when weremember
thataverage annual earnings in 197.5exceeded $8,000, it becomes clear that a great
innvworkers would havebeeneligible for ABR even with indexing.
Turning next tocolumns (14)-(6) of Table 3,wesee that the wage subsidy
ratesimplicit in automatic benefit recomputationwould have been reduced by about
one-thirdby indexing, just as suggested.
Nonetheless, this still leaves the average
subsidy rate for married men at about36%(assuminga 1% discount rate), and assignsl.
subsidy rates in the 3545 range to about 8o of all married workers.
Thus even when the 1977 amendments become fully effective, automatic benefit
recomputation will still provide large wage subsidies to most workers.
Interaction with Supplemental SecurityIncome(ssI)
One final proviso about recent revisions in the law. Since 1975, individuals
with poor earnings histories have been eligible to draw benefits from Supplemental
Security Income (ssi) that exceed the benefits they would be entitled to under the
standard social security program. For these individuals, who now comprise about one-
eighth of all social security recipients, automatic benefit recomputation is irrievant.
Thussome of the low income people that would have faced huge wage subsidies from ABR
prior to theadventof SSI (the upper tails of the distributions inTable3)no
longerhave this strong work incentive.
4. SummaryandConclusions
The main findings of this short paper are easy to summarize:
1. The earnings test for social security does not present a work disincentive
for the typical worker aged 62-64 because, if he loses benefits to the earnings test,
he recoups most or even more than all of them through an actuarial adjustment of his
future benefits. There are, however, exceptions to this--especially those few men
of this age who have dependent children.
2. At least prior to the 1977 amendments and the advent of SSI, the vast
majority of workers became subject to automatic benefit recomputation at rather low
levels of work effort. This provision provided an implicit wage subsidy of 5O-6O,
about the same asthetax rate in t,he earnings test, and it remained in effeot over
a much broader range of earnings.
3.Becauseof these two effects, and especially the latter, it seems likely
that the social security law--if understood by the public--should provide work
disincentives for only a small minority of individuals. It seems that social security
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should induce the majority of older workers to work harder.15.
4.Recent changes in the law, especially SSI andtheindexing provisions
in the 1977 amendments, will reduce the importance of automatic recomputation, though
it still seems likely that most individuals working close to full time will be subject
to it. Wage subsidies implicit in the benefit recomputation will be about two-thirds
as large as they were in the 1970s.
5.Socialsecurity no doubt distorts labor-leisure choices in many complex
ways, and therefore creates a variety of deadweight losses.But the glib assertion
that these distortions typically amount to powerful work disincentives is just that--
a 1ib assertion.
These findings, in turn, lead us to two sorts of conclusions--one aimed at
scholars doing research on the effects of social security, and the other aimed at
policyinakers.
6. Since a full understanding of the complex nature of the social security
lawshows thatitdoesnot provide significant work disincentives for many people,
themany recent econometric findings that social security reducedlabor supply and/or
encouraged retirement are surprising, to say theleast.19 The approaches used in
econometric studies of the labor supply effects of social security need rethinking,
and will probably have to be much more complicated than those that havebeen used to date.
7. In discussing automatic benefit recomputation with knowledgeable governhuLent
officials and academic researchers, we learned that while almost everyone knewthat
the provision existed, almost no one had any idea of its quantitative importance.
F1rthnrmore, the nature of the recomputation is clearly complex. Thesetwo facts
suggest tousthat many peopleeligible for social security benefits maynot understand
howtheircurrent earnings affect their future benefits. It is possible, therefore,
that social security is discouraging labor supply only because its provisions arepoorly
understood. If this hypothesis is correct, then one simple way to cure any'disincentive"
effects that social security may now be having on the labor supplydecisions of older16.
workers is simply to tell these workers how the law really works: Happily, this
policy initiative is non-partisan and non-ideological, requires no legislation, and
should entail negligible budgetary expense. A good policy, it would seem.
However, a broader policy issue can be raised. According to our arguments,
social security is probably distorting the labor-leisure decisions of most older
workers in the direction of greater work effort. This is particularly true of those
between 62 and 64 years of age, who on balance typically receive a 5O wage subsidy.
It is not clear what social purpose is served by this distortion.17.
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FOOTNGI'ES
'Boskin (1977), Quinn(1977),Boskin andthird(1978), Burkhauser (1977),
and Pellechio (1978).
2Th same formula holds forwomen, buttodate most married women have been
able to collect more as wives (50 percent of their husband's benefits) than they could
based on their own work histories. Hence our focus on men.
3For simplicity, it is assumed thatsocialsecurity benefits constitute
the only source of non-labor income, and income taxes are ignored.
1We have discovered somebunching at this point in our studies with the
Longitudinal Retirement History Survey (LRHS).
5Actually,future benefits, rathnr thanincreasing continually as current
earnings arewithheld, jump to offset a month's lost benefits whenever benefits
arewithheld inthat month.
6See,for example, Burkhauser (1977), pp. 5-6.
7Thewife is assumed to register for benefits as soon as she iseligible.
8ITere,and in what follows, we assume that a discount rate in the 1-3
range is most reasonable.
furthercomplicating distortion in the pre-1977 law is that workers who
had received partial benefits prior to age 65werenot eligible for this 1% increase.
10
See footnote 1.
"The formula forcomputing T varies depending upon theyear the individual
reachesage 62. For individuals reaching age 62 in 1973 or 1974, T is set to 19.
For individuals reaching 62 in 1975 or later, the formula is as described in the text
exceptthat the year the individual reaches age 62 is used instead of the year the
individual reaches age 6.
'2SincetheFIA formula is redistributive, this slope generally declines
W moveIo hih'r MF1)rnckets.Ilowevnr,there is a minimumPTA. For workers
withvery poor earnings histories the slope will therefore be zero.19.
13 . .
Specifically,B is 1.0 for a single man with no dependent children, 1.5
fora married man whosewifealso starts receiving benefitsat65,and0.5higher for
each dependent child--subject to a maximumfamilybenefitwhichis a piecewise linear
function of PL&. There arecorrespondingrules for determining the B factors for
survivors.
14 . . Fora minority of relatively high-wage workers,the current social security.
earnings ceiling will be reached somewhere online segment gh. At this point, the
recoinputation would cease being relevant andtheslope would return to the explicit
wage. The payroll taxalsoends at this point.
'5The last factor is relevant to when he will actually receive the increased
benefits derived from ABR. In all our computations we assumethat the worker begins
to receive full social security benefits (i.e., earnsless than m) starting "next year."
also made computations for a sample of married men retiring in 1971.
Becaust of the different law in effect then, the distributionof subsidy rates was
a bit lower, averaging 149%.
17The dollar figures in the 1977 formulas wore reduced, however, based on
thesizeof average earnings in 1975 compared with 1979, the yearthe new law first
went into effect.
18
For theearlygenerations of retirees undersocialsecurity, there was a
substantial net transfer payment that may have inducedearlier retirement through
income effects. These net transfers, however, have beendeclining In the recent
past.
partiallist of such studiesappeared in footnote 1.